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I. INTRODUCTION
Now more than ever before, shocking stories of child degradation
are being revealed all over the country. In recent months the
number of criminal prosecutions for child sexual abuse has risen dra-
matically. As a result of increased judicial activity in this area, recog-
nition of past inadequacies in the handling of child witnesses in such
cases has become inescapable. Traditional notions regarding children
as unreliable witnesses have proven to be unfounded in modern em-
pirical studies. Conclusive data indicates that children witnesses are
as reliable as adults. Legal requirements, which once prevented chil-
dren from qualifying as witnesses, have modernly been changed to
reflect those findings of reliability, and the policy favoring admission
of all relevant evidence has facilitated the use of child witnesses in
the courtroom.
However, with the increased use of child witnesses in sexual abuse
cases a common dilemma has become apparent: though the child-vic-
tim's evidence is usually the most important, the process for ex-
tracting that evidence often traumatizes young witnesses. The
victims are made victims once again.
In recognition of this revictimization, various reforms have been
proposed to alleviate the judicial burden placed on child-victim wit-
nesses. These reforms include expanded hearsay exceptions for chil-
dren, the use of expert testimony, videotapes, specially constructed
courtrooms, and closed-circuit television in lieu of live, in-court child
testimony. A common threat to each of the proposed reforms is the
right to confrontation of the sixth amendment. However, policy con-
siderations and artful construction of the reforms may combine to de-
feat any constitutional challenge.
II. THE RELIABILITY OF CHILD WITNESSES
Though traditional notions of child witness reliability have largely
been abandoned, it is necessary to consider those notions to set them
apart from the modern legal requirements for child victim witnesses
157
and the responses to their unique predicament. The presumptions of
old should not be allowed to taint the evaluation of modern rules and
proposals concerning child witnesses.
Traditional assumptions concerning the reliability of children as
witnesses are generally negative. Concern has been expressed over
the truthfulness of child witnesses,1 their susceptibility to leading or
suggestive questions,2 their ability to accurately recall events, 3 and
their need for special questioning techniques. 4 The dubious reputa-
tion children have acquired as witnesses is represented in even the
most respected legal treatises. 5
Empirical studies have produced results indicating that most of
these traditional assumptions are completely unfounded. According
to established statistics, there is in fact little correlation between age
and honesty.6 An experiment regarding the potential of children as
eyewitnesses conducted by Barbara Marin and others in 1979, dispells
traditional notions about the reliability and suggestibility of children
performing eyewitness tasks.7
In the Marin experiment, children and adults ranging in age from
5 to 22 watched the experimenter and a confederate engage in a
heated conversation. At varying intervals, those viewing the argu-
ment were asked to narrate exactly what they had seen, to answer
objective questions about the incident, including a leading question,
1. Melton, Children's Competency To Testify, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 79
(1981).
2. Studies have shown that leading questions often distort the memories of
adults, but the question raised is whether the memories of children are any more sus-
ceptible. Matin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 295, 297-304 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Marin].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. American Jurisprudence offers these comments on witness credibility:
In determining the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded his
testimony, regard may be had to his age and his mental or physical condition,
such as where the witness is a child, is intoxicated, is a narcotics addict, or is
insane, or of unsound or feeble mind.
81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 667 (1976) (footnotes omitted). The classification of chil-
dren along with drug addicts and mental incompetents aptly reflects the suspect view
of children as witnesses.
Leading commentators on the subject share this lack of trust: "There is the danger
that a child will intermingle imagination with memory and thus have incorrect state-
ments irretrievably engraved on the record by a guileless witness with no conception
that they are incorrect or that the words should not have been spoken." Stafford, The
Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REv. 303, 309 (1962) (footnotes omitted). It hardly
seems possible that children three to five years old could "imagine" detailed sexual ac-
tivity which is not normally openly discussed, even among adults.
6. From 1969 to 1974, Michigan police referred 147 children to a polygraph exam-
iner to test the truthfulness of their allegations of sexual abuse. Of the 147 children
tested, only one was judged to be lying. Melton, supra note 1, at 79.
7. Marin, supra note 2, at 303-04.
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and to identify the confederate from a photo array.8 Results indi-
cated that very young children were as capable as adults in answer-
ing direct questions about the incident.9 Also, young children scored
as well as adults in identifying from a photo array.' 0 Perhaps most
surprising was the data indicating that children were no more easily
swayed to answer incorrectly by the use of leading questions than
were adults." One finding did indicate that children were not as ca-
pable as adults to freely articulate their version of what occurred.
Nonetheless, while the youngest children tended to say little, what
they did say was three times more likely to be accurate than what
the adults said.12
The Matin study concluded that the main problem with young wit-
nesses is not their ability to accurately perceive events, but their abil-
ity to accurately and meaningfully report their perceptions. Given
certain external prompts and cues, however, "the young witness
would be expected to perform quite adequately."' 3 In the final analy-
sis, "it would seem, then, that children as young as five years of age
are no less competent or credible as eyewitnesses than are adults
when responding to direct objective questions."' 4
Other studies have come up with results contradicting the findings
8. Ninety-six subjects were tested in four groups consisting of twenty-four per
group. The four groups were comprised of the following subjects, respectively: kinder-
garten and first graders, third and fourth graders, seventh and eighth graders, and col-
lege students. They were tested individually in a small room where the confederate
stormed in, argued with the experimenter over the use of the room, then stormed out.
The duration of a subject's exposure to the confederate was fifteen seconds, from a dis-
tance of approximately seven feet. At intervals of ten or thirty minutes, the subjects
were evaluated on free recall, direct questions including one leading question, and
photo identification. Two weeks later, the subjects returned and were reassessed, this
time using a non-leading question. Id at 297-98.
9. The results of the objective questions concerning this incident indicated no sig-
nificant difference of the percentage of questions correctly answered between the dif-
ferent age groups. Id. at 301.
10. Id. at 302.
11. Id. at 303. But see Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to
Suggestion, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 201 (1980).
12. The youngest children averaged only 1.42 descriptive statements on free recall,
while the three older groups averaged 3.75, 6.5, and 8.25 descriptive statements, respec-
tively. However, the youngsters gave incorrect statements only 3% of the time, while
the older groups did so at the rate of 12%, 8%, and 10%, respectively. Marin, supra
note 2, at 304. In fact, free narration skills have shown marked improvement with age
in other studies. Id. at 296-97.
13. Id at 297. "It appears that children are no more likely than are adults to fabri-
cate incorrect responses, and that when their testimony is elicited through the use of
appropriate cues, it is no less credible than that of adults." Id at 304.
14. Id.
of Matin. One such study, published in 1980, produced data indicat-
ing that third grade subjects were inferior to older subjects in mem-
ory capacity, and in their ability to resist suggestion.' 5 However, this
test did not create a true live eyewitness task, as did the Matin test.16
Furthermore, a second round of testing produced conflicting results,
leading the experimenters to conclude that children "are still poten-
tially good sources of eyewitness information."17
Other commentators have criticized the Marin study as lacking.
Gary Melton, of the University of Virginia Institute of Law, Psychia-
try and Public Policy, states that the question whether child wit-
nesses are particularly suggestible needs further research. Melton
notes that only one leading question was used in the Main study and
that the interviewer probably had less authority in the eyes of a child
than would an attorney in a courtroom.' 8 Melton also observed that
young children's need for cues to stimulate recollection may com-
pound the problem of suggestibility.19 However, Melton included no
empirical data to support his conclusions, and even he admits that to
date, the Main experiment is the only one involving "a courtroom-
like task."20
Now that the misconceptions about the reliability of children eye-
witnesses have been cleared away, courts and legislatures are begin-
ning to change the legal requirements children must meet to qualify
as witnesses.
III. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CHILD WITNESSES: COMPETENCE
A. Oaths
At common law, the main hurdle children had to overcome in or-
der to be allowed to testify was swearing the oath. The common law
required that all witnesses believe in a diety in order to be properly
sworn,2' and children of "tender years" were considered incapable of
giving evidence under oath.22 However, a child of "tender years" was
15. Cohen & Harnick, supra note 11, at 201.
16. Id. at 204-05. This test involved the viewing of a movie by the subjects with
subsequent questioning about events in the movie. The Matin scenario, created with
the help of a confederate, much more closely approximated a true eyewitness situa-
tion. Id.
17. Id. at 209.
18. Melton, supra note 1, at 80-81.
19. Id. at 81.
20. Id. at 209.
21. Comment, Evidence - Competency of Child Witness - Four-Year-Old Is Not
Per Se Incompetent And Need Not Be Sworn By An An (sic] Adult Oath, Nor Have In-
dependent Recollection In Order To Be Ajudged Competent, 11 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 339, 342
n.16 (1980).
22. Jerrard, The Evidence of a Child, 134 NEW L.J. 109 (1984). At common law, a
presumption of competency existed for a proposed witness over fourteen years of age,
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not one of any particular age, and the court often determined a
child's qualifications by his ability to give evidence under oath.23
The leading case at common law, R. v. Brasier,24 involved an as-
sault on a seven-year-old child. The judges agreed that testimony
could be legally admitted only upon oath, and that a child of seven
years or younger may be properly sworn if the court determined that
the child had sufficient understanding of the nature and conse-
quences of the oath.25 Finding insufficient understanding, the court
ruled the child's testimony inadmissible.26
The oath as an obstacle to child witness testimony waned with the
passage of time. The traditional American view of child competency
was set forth in Wheeler v. United States.2 7 In that case, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated:
While no one would think of calling as a witness an infant only two or three
years old, there is no precise age which determines the question of compe-
tency. This depends on the capacity and intelligence of the child, his apprecia-
tion of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to
tell the former. The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial
judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent posses-
sion or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will
tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of
the obligations of an oath.2 8
The Wheeler Court did not abandon the necessity of a child's un-
derstanding of the oath, but it stressed other factors which have since
become the basis of modern child competency requirements: the
but proof of competency had to be made for witnesses under fourteen. Comment,
supra note 21, at 343-44.
23. Jerrard, supra note 22, at 109.
24. 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).
25. Id. at 202.
26. Id at 202-03.
27. 159 U.S. 523 (1895). In England, the common law position was altered by sec-
tion 38 of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933, which states:
(1) [W]here, in any proceedings against any person for any offence, any child
of tender years called as a witness does not in the opinion of the court under-
stand the nature of the oath, his evidence may be received though not given
upon oath, if in the opinion of the court, he is possessed of sufficient intelli-
gence to justify the reception of the evidence, and understands the duty of
telling the truth.
Jerrard, supra note 22, at 109.
28. Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524-25. Interestingly, the Wheeler court, in dicta, did sug-
gest a cut-off age of four, below which a child might be considered per se incompetent.
Other American courts have suggested similar age limits for competency: "'Age, at
least after four years are past, does not touch competency, and the question is one of
intelligence'...." State v. Juneau, 88 Wis. 180, 182, 59 N.W. 580, 580 (1894). However,
as the problem of sexual abuse of very young children becomes more visible in modern
times, and given that very young children are reliable witnesses, such judicial precon-
ceptions are unwarranted.
child's capacity and intelligence, his appreciation of the difference be-
tween truth and falsehood, and his appreciation of the duty to tell
the truth.
Modernly, states have abandoned the traditional oath as a strict re-
quirement for child witness competency. This shift is well illustrated
by the New Jersey case, State ex. rel. R.R., Jr.29 In the case, a four-
year-old child, Sean, had been sexually abused. The trial court re-
fused to rule Sean incompetent per se, and administered an oath
which had been adapted to account for his age and level of compre-
hension.30 R.R., the accused minor, was adjudicated a juvenile delin-
quent by the lower court, but the decision was reversed on appeal. 31
The appellate division ruled that Sean's oath was improper because it
was not administered in the traditional form as mandated by Rule 18
of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.32 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed the appellate division, and held that any oath which
shows a special commitment on the part of the witness to tell the
truth, upon pain of any type of future punishment, satisfies the re-
quirements for an oath under Rule 18 of the New Jersey Rules of Ev-
idence.3 3 This ruling typifies the modern American interpretation of
the oath requirement for child witness competency.34
Thus, the oath requirement has waned as an impediment to child
29. 79 N.J. 97, 398 A.2d 76 (1979).
30. Sean's oath ran as follows:
The Clerk: Will you tell the truth to this Court?
The Witness: Yes.
The Clerk: Do you believe in God?
The Witness: Yes.
The Clerk: If you lie do you believe that God will punish you?
The Witness: No.
The Clerk: God will not punish you if you tell a lie? Or will He punish you?
The Witness: He will.
The Clerk: He will. The boy is sworn, Judge.
Id. at 104, 398 A.2d at 79.
31. The per curiam opinion of the appellate division was unpublished. Id. at 107,
398 A.2d at 79.
32. Id. at 107, 398 A.2d at 81. Rule 18 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence states:
"A witness before testifying shall be required to take an oath or make an affirmation
or declaration to tell the truth under the penalty provided by the law. No witness may
be barred from testifying because of religion or lack of it." N.J. R. EVID. 18.
33. Ex. ReL R.R., 79 N.J. at 107-11, 398 A.2d at 82-83. The court interpreted Rule
18 as requiring "an" oath, not "the" oath. Id at 108, 398 A.2d at 81. The court also
ruled that a four-year-old child is not per se incompetent as a witness. Any witness'
competency should be judged by the trial court according to Rule 17 of the New
Jersey Rules of Evidence. Id at 111, 398 A.2d at 83.
34. The modern British view of child witness competency is much the same, and
well represented in R. v. Hayes, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 234:
The important consideration, we think, when a judge has to decide whether a
child should properly be sworn, is whether the child has a sufficient apprecia-
tion of the solemnity of the occasion and the added responsibility to tell the
truth, which is involved in taking an oath, over and above the duty to tell the
truth which is an ordinary duty of normal social conduct.
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witness testimony. However, other obstacles still exist. A child's
general mental capacity may still serve as a point of challenge for ex-
clusion of his testimony.
B. General Capacity Requirements
The standards used to judge child witness competency have devel-
oped through case law, and have recently been codified into state evi-
dence codes. Maine's experience is exemplary of this trend, and most
states follow Maine's standards in determining child witness
competency. 35
The 1978 Maine case, State v. Samson,36 set out three criteria for
determining child witness competency: (1) the child's ability to un-
derstand and answer questions intelligently, (2) the child's ability to
accurately relate a true version of his sense impression, and (3) the
child's ability to understand the difference between truth and
falsehood.37
The Samson criteria were replaced by Rule 601(b) of the Maine
Rules of Evidence in the 1980 case of State v. Pinkham.38 The de-
fendant in that case sought to rely on the Samson criteria to chal-
lenge the admissibility of an eight-year-old's adverse testimony by
challenging her competency. The court rejected the Samson criteria
and, instead, looked to the recently enacted Rule 601(b) of the Maine
Rules of Evidence. 39 Under Rule 601(b) the court found that the
child need only to express herself so as to be understood by the judge
and jury, and to know what telling the truth means.40 The court held
that the other Samson criteria went only to the weight and credibil-
Id. at 237. In Canada, the testimony of a child may be received without the child first
taking an oath. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-10, § 16 (1970).
One aspect of the child oath requirement which has remained constant in all Anglo
courts since the common law is the fact that whatever determination is made rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court.
35. 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 455, 468-69 (1980).
36. 388 A.2d 60 (Me. 1978).
37. 1L at 64.
38. 411 A.2d 1021 (Me. 1980).
39. Id at 1023. Maine Rule of Evidence 601(b) states:
A person is disqualified to be a witness if the court finds that (a) the proposed
witness is incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be
understood by a judge and jury... or (b) the proposed witness is incapable of
understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. ...
ME. R. EVID. 601(b).
Similar provisions exist in the evidence codes of many states. See, e.g., N.J. R. EVID.
17, the language of which is virtually identical to that of the Maine rule.
40. Pinkham, 411 A.2d at 1023.
ity to be accorded the child's testimony, not to her competency to
testify.41
Maine's standard, that a child is competent to testify if he is able to
express himself and is able to understand what it means to tell the
truth, is followed in most American jurisdictions.42 It represents a
trend away from the traditional distrust of children's testimony, and
towards the widely accepted policy of admitting all relevant evidence
wherever possible.
Though the courts have overcome the problems of child witness re-
liability and of the competency standards requisite to the admissibil-
ity of child testimony, they now face a new problem raised by the use
of children as witnesses: the trauma children experience when testi-
fying in court about painful events. State legislative and judicial
branches have responded to that problem with proposals for re-
forming the way child testimony is taken in some cases.
IV. THE CHILD VICTIM REVICTIMIZED
Using young children as witnesses in the prosecution of sexual
abuse cases involves the inherent danger of psychologically trauma-
tizing the child. This danger has been widely recognized by commen-
tators on the subject of child witnesses. Noted psychologist David
Libai coined the phrase "legal process trauma," to represent the neg-
ative impact of criminal prosecutions against sex offenders on child
victims.43 Often the "legal process trauma" itself can be more devas-
tating than the actual abuse. The prosecution of a child abuse case
involves interviews and interrogation of the child by numerous agen-
cies.44 Repeated recollection of the abuse episode may aggravate the
traumatization.45 Finally, some believe the trauma of testifying to
painful experiences in open court to be the most damaging.46
This revictimization of child victims raises other problems which
reach beyond the effect on the child's mind; they impact on the func-
41. Id.
42. See 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 455, 468 n. 112, 469 n. 113 (1980).
43. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal
Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 983 (1969).
44. This may include interviews by psychologists, social workers, court appointed
guardians, police, attorneys, etc. See, e.g., Haas, The Use of Videotape in Child Abuse
Cases, 8 NOVA L.J. 373, 373 (1984).
45. Id. Various reforms have been proposed to solve the problem of multiple in-
terviews, one of which is a single collective investigatory interview. Id.
46. Comment, Libai's Child Courtroom" Is It Constitutional?, 7 J. Juv. L. 31, 32
(1983). A child's in-court testimony must still conform with rules of criminal proce-
dure, "which may exacerbate their victimization. In particular, the defendant's right
to confrontation and cross-examination and to a public trial and the public's right of
access to trials may result in the child victim's exposure to prolonged stress, embarass-
ment, and recollection of the experience of abuse." Melton, Psycholegal Issues in
Child Victims' Interaction with the Legal System, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 274, 274 (1980).
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tioning of the judicial system. Some commentators believe that the
trauma accompanying in-court testimony produces unreliable evi-
dence.47 This would inhibit the court's fact finding task and defeat
the purpose of using the child as a witness in the first place. Impos-
ing upon a child witness the rigors of the judicial process may also
result in a popular perception of the court as perpetrator, rather than
protector.48 Given the bizarre, and often horrific details of many
child sexual abuse cases, such a characterization may not be far from
correct.49
47. Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof At Trial Without Testimony In Court by The
Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131, 137 (1981). Child witnesses suffer certain inher-
ent cognitive limitations, which, if aggravated, may produce unreliable testimony:
They have a subjective sense of time... especially with regard to experiences
such as incest which are repeated over time - and a limited ability to commu-
nicate what they do understand and recall. These natural disabilities tend to
intensify when the child is afraid or under emotional stress, as the child may
regress to a less mature state or withdraw entirely.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
48. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is The Court A Protector Or Perpetra-
tor?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 643 (1982). "The child who is required to testify in
court may experience severe psychological stress in re-living the witnessed event. The
judicial system has not been sensitive to the victimization that a child may face in the
courtroom. Courts, in effect, have become perpetrators, not protectors of the child's
interests." Id.
A municipal court judge in Solano County, California, ordered that a twelve-year-old
girl be held in juvenile hall for eight days for contempt of court when she refused to
testify against her stepfather on felony child molestation charges. What ostensibly ap-
peared to the press and public as an outrage of revictimization, however, was actually
the judge's attempt to prevent witness intimidation and recurrence of the offense.
L.A. Daily J., Jan. 31, 1984, at 4, col. 3.
49. "Certainly a five year old girl should be spared the necessity of testifying
against her father in a rape case if at all possible....
We do not agree ... that five year old girls should be dragged in to court to testify
and to re-live the horrifying experience of being raped." State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259,
363-65, 394 P.2d 196, 199-200 (1964).
In Jordan, Minnesota, two child abuse rings were discovered in 1984, and subsequent
criminal proceedings resulted in acquittal of the two defendants. The child witnesses
involved were badgered about times, places, and dates; they were also accused of lying
and of being preprogrammed due to their similar descriptions of sexual penetration.
Several left the witness stand in tears. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 2, 1984, at 4, col. 3.
In Manhattan Beach, California, the highly publicized McMartin preschool case,
which arose in the fall of 1983, has produced particularly bizzare child testimony at the
preliminary hearing. The second child to testify at the hearing was a ten-year-old boy.
On direct examination, he alleged that he was forced to perform sex acts with all
seven defendants, including the seventy-seven-year-old matron of the preschool. He
further testified to having been forced to watch two of the defendants, brother and sis-
ter, have sex. He described having been photographed in the nude, being tied up dur-
ing "naked games," being shown animal slaughters, and having the lives of his parents
threatened. On cross-examination, the boy vividly described the hacking to death of
two ponies and of being forced to drink the blood of a slaughtered rabbit. L.A. Times,
Feb. 25, 1985, § II, at 3, col. 5. Assuming for argument's sake that these allegations are
V. RESPONSE TO THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CHILD WITNESSES
A. The Hearsay Exceptions
One response to the problems associated with child witness testi-
mony has been liberality in the admission of hearsay statements of
children. The hearsay rule, one of the oldest canons in the law of ev-
idence, was designed to prohibit the introduction of oral or written
evidence of statements made out of court, when that statement is be-
ing offered for the truth of the matter asserted.50 Various excep-
tions to the rule arose at common law, many of which have been
codified into the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 '
The chain of events in the typical child sexual abuse case empha-
sizes the special need for child hearsay evidence. Generally, the child
is the only witness to the crime. 52 Physical evidence of the crime is
seldom available because the crimes are generally of a non-violent
nature, and children rarely resist their molesters.53 Also, children's
memories fade rapidly over time, so statements made closer in time
to the event are likely to be more accurate.54
For these reasons, along with other considerations concerning the
well-being of the child, many courts and state legislatures have
adopted rules to facilitate the admissibility of child victim hearsay
statements. 55
1. Expansion of the Res Gestae and Excited Utterance
Exceptions
At common law, the rule banning all hearsay became unfeasible
true, it is easy to see how forced repetition in the judicial processes might place the
courts in a position of revictimizing the child victims.
50. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 584 (2d ed. 1972).
51. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803-04.
52. Comment, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex
Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1749 (1983).
53. Id. "Most crimes consist of petting, exhibitionism, fondling, and oral copula-
tion, activities that do not involve forceful physical contact." Id. at 1750 (footnote
omitted).
54. Id. This is particularly important because long periods of time often pass be-
tween the criminal act and the trial. Id. at 1750-51.
55. For a sympathetic view toward expansion of child victim hearsay exceptions,
see Comment, supra note 52. See also Note, A Tender Years Doctrine for the Juvenile
Courts: An Fffective Way to Protect the Sexually Abused Child, 61 U. DET. J. UR. L.
249 (1984) (discussion of expansion of various hearsay exceptions in Michigan, and pro-
posal for "tender years" exception) [hereinafter cited as A Tender Years Doctrine];
Pierron, The New Kansas Law Regarding Admissibility of Child-Victim Hearsay State-
ments, 52 KAN. B.A. J. 88 (1983) (discussion of Kansas' recognized exceptions, its new
exception, and the need for child hearsay); Ohio Supreme Court Review, State v.
Duncan: The Relationship Between Abusive Sexual Acts and the Admissibility of
Spontaneous Exclamations, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 498 (1979) (casenote discusses liberali-
zation of spontaneous utterance exception in Ohio) [hereinafter cited as Ohio Supreme
Court Review].
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because some hearsay statements were the most reliable form of evi-
dence available and did not violate the purposes of the rule.5 6 In re-
sponse, a broad exception to the hearsay rule known as "res gestae"
developed. "Res gestae" for evidentiary purposes is generally defined
as a statement made at the time of an event, explaining that event or
occurrence. Considering the totality of circumstances, sufficient time
will not have passed to contrive or fabricate the statement so as to
render it self-serving.5 7 The res gestae exceptions were based on the
notion that spontaneity made the hearsay statements especially
trustworthy.58
The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule fell into disfavor due
to its ill-defined and ever-expanding characteristics. 59 Res gestae
then evolved into specific exceptions, the foremost being the excited
utterance exception which has been widely accepted. The excited ut-
terance exception has two requirements: first, the occurrence or
event must be sufficiently startling to render the normal reflective
thought processes of an observer inoperative; and second, the state-
ment must be a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and
not the result of reflective thought.60 In a number of jurisdictions,
courts have relaxed the traditional requirements of spontaneity and
contemporaneousness for statements by young children to create a
"tender years" variation of the excited utterance exception.6 1
56. The purposes behind the rule include insuring the trustworthiness and neces-
sity of the evidence offered. 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 1420-22 (J.
Chadbourn ed. 1974). When it was shown that the hearsay testimony did not offend
the policy supporting the hearsay rule and the trustworthiness and necessity of the ev-
idence could be established without cross-examination of the declarant, exclusion no
longer made sense. Id.
57. See, A Tender Years Doctrine, supra note 55, at 253.
58. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 50, § 288, at 687.
59. McCormick expressed this sentiment: "[flt seems clear that the law has now
reached a stage at which this desirable policy of widening admissibility [through res
gestae] will be best served by other means." Id.
60. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 50, § 297, at 704.
61. See, e.g., A Tender Years Doctrine, supra note 55, at 255-56. See also Wheeler
v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019, reh'g denied,
348 U.S. 852 (1954); Snowden v. United States, 2 App. D.C. 89 (1893); Soto v. Territory,
12 Ariz. 36, 94 P. 1104 (1908); State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St. 2d 215, 373 N.E.2d 1234
(1978); State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10, 106 N.E. 660 (1914); State v. Hutchison, 222 Or.
533, 353 P.2d 1047 (1960).
Many commentators support the trend of liberalizing exceptions to the hearsay rule,
using empirical evidence as justification:
This type of approach has been supported through recent findings in social re-
search which indicates that the evidentiary problems in child abuse and ne-
glect cases result in frequent failures to establish a prima facie case and often
2. The Michigan Experience
The expansion of the admissibility of hearsay evidence in child
abuse cases through the excited utterance exception has not enjoyed
unfettered development. A 1982 Michigan Supreme Court case ex-
emplifies the continuing respect for the traditional policy against
hearsay.6 2 In Michigan, evolution of the common law resulted in a
"tender years" exception to the rule against hearsay. The exception
allowed the otherwise excludable hearsay statements of a child of
tender years, claiming to have been sexually abused, to be admitted
as corroborative evidence through a third person's testimony.63
The Michigan Supreme Court abolished the "tender years" excep-
tion in People v. Kreiner.64 In Kreiner, the court held that the Michi-
gan Rules of Evidence, promulgated in 1978, only adopted the
hearsay exceptions specifically enumerated therein, which did not in-
clude the "tender years" exception.6 5 The court's decision in Kreiner
was criticized for failing to take into account the special circum-
stances of a sexual abuse case, and was followed by proposals for
reform.66
serve to protect the perpetrator of the crime and not the child who has been
victimized.
Ohio Supreme Court Review, supra note 55, at 507. See also id, at 507 n.65.
62. People v. Kreiner, 415 Mich. 372, 329 N.W.2d 716 (1982).
63. People v. Baker, 251 Mich. 322, 232 N.W. 381 (1930).
The rule in this State is that where the victim is of tender years the testimony
of the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration of her evi-
dence, if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indica-
tion of manufacture;... so far as it is caused by fear or other equally effective
circumstance.
Id. at 326, 232 N.W. at 383.
64. 415 Mich. 372, 329 N.W.2d 716 (1982).
65. 415 Mich. 377-78, 329 N.W.2d at 719-20.
66. Factors that courts should take into account when considering child victim
hearsay include:
a recognition of the trauma suffered by a sexually abused child as well as the
child's inability to remember and articulate the circumstances of an offense;
the fact that the child is often the only source of proof as to an offense; the
need to act in the best interests of the child and the necessary protections that
must follow therefrom; and other difficulties that are generally associated
with the increased incidences of sexual abuse of children.
A Tender Years Doctrine, supra note 55, at 250-51.
One proposal for reform recommended an addition to the Michigan Juvenile Court
Rules, which have jurisdiction over child abuse cases, as follows:
Any out-of-court statement made by a child under ten years of age shall be
admissible as competent evidence in any juvenile court proceeding instituted
on complaint of abuse/neglect, provided the court finds:
1) that the statement concerns sexual conduct perpetrated with or upon the
child; and
2) that under the circumstances the statement possesses sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
3) that some other evidence supports the child's allegation of illegal sexual
conduct.
Id. at 272. The author of the proposal goes on to acknowledge that "[t]he circumstan-
tial guarantees of truthworthiness recognized by the Michigan courts prior to Kreiner,
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Such proposals for reform with regard to child victim testimony
have arisen in other jurisdictions as well. Several states have codified
different versions of the exception, while others are presently consid-
ering more innovative reform measures.
3. The Washington Experience
In 1982, the State of Washington codified its version of an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, applicable in criminal prosecutions for child
sexual abuse. 67 The exception is unique because it gives the trial
court discretion in determining whether the statement is trustwor-
thy.68 The Washington exception is typical of others recently enacted
in several states.69
Pursuant to the exception, the hearsay statements of a child under
age ten, describing a sexual act performed with or on the child, is ad-
missible if certain requirements are met. First, the court must find,
however, did not simply vanish because the rules of evidence were codified." Id. The
author also asserts that "[tihe proposed rule, or a comparable alternative, recognizes
that children have experiences, capabilities, and vulnerabilities that are significantly
different from those of adults." Id.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1985) provides:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise ad-
missible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceed-
ings in the courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide suffi-
cient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided That when the child is unavaila-
ble as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is cor-
roborative evidence of the act.
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the propo-
nent of the statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in ad-
vance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to prepare to meet the statement.
Id.
68. With other Washington exceptions, the judge merely determines whether the
statement falls under the specific circumstances set forth in the exception to indicate
trustworthiness. See WASH. R. EVID. 803-04.
69. Colorado, Utah, and Kansas have recently enacted similar provisions in what
appears to be a developing trend. For a discussion of Kansas' new legislation, see gen-
erally Pierron, supra note 55. For a discussion of the new laws in Colorado, Utah, and
Washington, see Comment, The Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay Exception: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 8 J. Juv. L. 59 (1984). For a detailed discussion of the new Colorado
law, see Garnett, Children as Witnesses: Competency and Rules Favoring Their Testi-
mony, 12 COLO. LAW. 1982 (1983). For a discussion of California's proposed new legis-
lation, see L.A. Daily J., Apr. 12, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
in a hearing outside the jury's presence, that the statement bears suf-
ficient indicia of reliability. Next, the child must either testify at the
proceeding or be considered as an unavailable witness. If the child is
unavailable, there must be corroborative evidence of the act of sexual
contact described. Also, the prosecution must notify the defendant of
its intention to use the statement, giving the defendant enough time
to prepare a defense.7 0
Prior to the adoption of the new exception, Washington courts had
followed the trend of expanding the excited utterance exception to
admit child victim hearsay.71 However, the excited utterance excep-
tion was being construed to accommodate statements never intended
to come under the exception as originally conceived. This expansive
application could have two negative effects: (1) it could make discre-
tionary what was originally meant to be a non-discretionary excep-
tion,72 and (2) expansion of the old exception to meet special needs in
child sexual abuse cases might serve as a precursor to further expan-
sive applications in other, less appropriate, types of cases.73
The new exception solves these problems by codifying the discre-
tion already being exercised in the liberal application of the excited
utterance exception, thereby creating a discretionary exception.74
The new exception now achieves its intended purpose as a discretion-
ary mechanism. Furthermore, it will not create the precedential con-
fusion generated by the old excited utterance applications. 7 5
The Washington statute has received its share of criticism. As to
the Act's operation with an available declarant, it has been criticized
for admitting, as substantive evidence, prior consistent statements of
witnesses and prior inconsistent statements not made under oath.76
As to its operation with an unavailable declarant, the Act has been
criticized for allowing hearsay testimony from incompetent
children.77
70. See supra note 67.
71. Comment, Sexual Abuse of Children - Washington's New Hearsay Exception,
58 WASH. L. REV. 813, 818-19 (1983).
72. Id. at 819.
73. Id.
74. The factors of time, content, and circumstances required by the new exception
are substantially the same as those considered under the old liberal application of the
excited utterance exception. Id
75. Under the new exception, appellate decisions will provide trial courts with gui-
dance as to how to apply its elements. Id. at 820.
Another advantage of the new exception is that it provides the defendant with a
greater ability to prepare a defense. In the past, the defendant had no warning as to
whether such a statement would be proposed for admission, and no indication of how
far the court would stretch the excited utterance exception. Id. at 819-20.
76. Comment, Cotkfronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality
of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387, 391-92 (1984).
77. Id. at 392. Failing to define unavailability, the Act admits into evidence state-
ments of a child held incompetent to testify. Id. This undermines the traditional pref-
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Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Act has come on constitu-
tional grounds involving the defendant's sixth amendment right to
confrontation. 78 Critics of the Washington Act speculate that the Act
will be used primarily when the defendant is in the greatest need of
his constitutional rights, thereby undermining his right to
confrontation. 79
B. The Confrontation Clause Challenge to Child Hearsay
Exceptions
Washington's hearsay exception and others like it are subject to at-
tack on sixth amendment right of confrontation grounds. The sixth
amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. . . ,"80 The confrontation clause is designed to provide the trier
of fact with a basis for evaluating statements offered into evidence.8l
The United States Supreme Court has defined the right of confronta-
tion as requiring first, the presence of the witness at trial,82 and sec-
ond, an opportunity for the defendant to effectively cross-examine
the witness.8 3 These requirements are intended to allow the jury to
evaluate the witness' testimony by observing his overall demeanor
erence for firsthand evidence. If a child would make a poor witness, the prosecutor
will not want him to testify and may allege that he is incompetent. A judge, sympa-
thetic to the plight of the child victim witness, may also find him incompetent to spare
him the rigors of in-court testimony. In any case, the hearsay evidence is admissible
regardless of availability. The end result is that both prosecutors and judges may relax
their standards, relying instead on findings of incompetency and thus ignoring the
well-established preference for firsthand evidence. Id at 398. Furthermore, evidence
that the sexual act took place is in no way related to whether or not the child is telling
the truth, and thus does not properly corroborate the latter. Id. at 397-98.
78. Id at 398-403.
79. In situations where the prosecution has strong corroborative evidence, admis-
sion of the child's hearsay statements will probably not be necessary. Given inconclu-
sive evidence, however, the prosecutor may need those statements to prove his case.
Thus, when the state's case is at its weakest, and the defendant is in the greatest need
of his constitutional rights, the new hearsay exception is most likely to be used. The
result is that the Act will be used most often where it tends to undermine a defend-
ant's right to confrontation. Id. at 402. However, this argument can be refuted when
one considers that most accepted hearsay exceptions operate in the same way, and
have passed constitutional muster when attacked.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
81. The basis for evaluation is the demeanor and credibility of a witness. Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 160-61 (1970).
82. Id. at 158. See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721, 725 (1968); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
83. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 418-19 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
and to allow the defendant to challenge the witness' credibility
through cross-examination.
If taken as an absolute, the confrontation clause would exclude all
hearsay evidence. However, the right is not absolute,84 and some-
times must be sacrificed for more important policy considerations.85
The accepted hearsay exceptions allow the right to be sacrificed
where the statements in question have strong indicia of trustworthi-
ness and necessity. Hearsay exceptions themselves are not tested in-
dividually by the Supreme Court for their constitutionality. Rather,
courts test the constitutionality of specific applications of the excep-
tions on an ad hoc basis.8 6 Thus, in the final analysis, the question is
not whether the Washington exception itself is unconstitutional, but
whether specific applications are unconstitutional.8 7 Modeled after
the exceptions to the federal rules, Washington's sexually abused
child hearsay exception and those similar to it seem able to withstand
constitutional attack based on the confrontation clause.88
The trend adopting codified child victim hearsay exceptions is only
one response to the problems raised by the use of children as wit-
nesses. Various other responses have arisen in different jurisdic-
tions.8 9 Aside from hearsay, the most pervasive responses have come
in the areas of expert testimony and the use of audio visual aids as a
substitute for child witness testimony.
84. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66 (1980).
85. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Supreme
Court ruled that the right to confrontation outweighed the statutory policy of protect-
ing a juvenile's confidentiality in a juvenile court proceeding.
86. Comment, supra note 71, at 822.
87. Id. It is conceivable that if every possible application of the exception were
deemed unconstitutional, the exception itself would for all intents and purposes be
unconstitutional.
88. Comment, supra note 69, at 72-73.
89. For a discussion of the liberal trend in state courts' admitting evidence of vari-
ous kinds in child sexual abuse cases, see Comment, Liberalization In The Admissibil-
ity of Evidence In Child Abuse And Child Molestation Cases, 7 J. Juv. L. 206 (1983).
This comment discusses the following topics: trends in the admissibility of child testi-
mony, id. at 205; the use of photographs as evidence in the absence of the victim's testi-
mony, id. at 208 (see also Torres v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1021 (Ind. 1982) (Supreme Court
of Indiana affirms conviction based on photographic evidence alone)); trends in the ad-
missibility of evidence showing the defendant to have a history of child abuse/molesta-
tion, Comment, supra at 208 (for an in-depth discussion of the admissibility of similar
evidence, see Note, Evidence, Child Abuse, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 769 (1981); Pais-
ley, Similar Facts And "Possible Conspiracy". Does Guay Veto The Voir Dire, 1 Sup.
CT. REV. 375 (1980)); and trends in the use of expert witnesses to establish the credibil-
ity of the testimony of the child abuse/molestation victim, Comment, supra at 210. For
a summary of recent California legislation designed to impose harsher criminal penal-
ties on sex offenders, especially those victimizing children, see Selected 1981 California
Legislation, 13 PAC. L.J. 633, 634 (1982).
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C. Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Bearing in mind the trauma which commonly accompanies the sex-
ually abused child's testimony, one alternative to in-court testimony
has been suggested which involves the use of tape recorded pretrial
examinations accompanied by expert testimony.90 The proposal9'
would not require in-court testimony by the child witness or subject
the child to multiple pretrial interrogations.
The child's only interview would be conducted with an expert so-
cial worker. The expert would possess dual qualifications including
experience in the psychology of child sexual abuse and familiarity
with pertinent legal standards. Expert and victim could meet in an
interviewing room, accompanied by all parties to the action. Adverse
parties having questions for the victim could submit them to the ex-
pert at a recess, whereupon the expert could then submit them to the
witness. The entire session could be recorded, preferably on video-
tape. Later, the court and parties could review the tapes and ask any
additional questions of the expert, who would then relay them to the
child. This process would end either when all the parties are satis-
fied or when the expert decides that further questioning would not
be in the best interest of the child. At trial, the tapes would be sub-
stituted for the child's testimony. Either party could call the expert
to testify as to his method of questioning and to discuss theories indi-
cating whether the child's story is authentic.92
The benefits espoused by the supporters of the proposal are sev-
eral.9 3 First, rather than traumatize the child, the interview would
amount to therapy. Second, due to the low stress atmosphere, the ev-
idence obtained would be more reliable than in-court testimony.
Third, the parties would have an opportunity to question the child
several times on any issue. Fourth, the defendant's due process
rights would be better served by allowing him ample opportunity to
review the evidence before trial. Finally, the interview would meet
any hearsay or right to confrontation challenges. The unavailability
requirement for admissible hearsay could be utilized, supported by
the overriding policy against traumatizing the victim. Furthermore,
the evidence can be acquired at a proceeding prior to the trial where
the defendant has an opportunity to conduct a modified form of
90. Note, supra note 47, at 132.
91. Id at 139-40.
92. Id
93. I at 141-42.
cross-examination. 94
This proposal presents a viable alternative to the child's in-court
testimony. However, it has not been implemented in any jurisdiction
to date. The plan assumes the admissibility of both expert witness
testimony on child abuse and of a videotaped interview. Admission
of such evidence can be problematic, and unless precedent is set al-
lowing these obstacles to be overcome, the proposal may never see its
day in court.
As suggested earlier, attorneys, judges and juries often harbor mis-
conceptions about child sexual abuse cases. Attorneys expect to find
proof of violence and force upon examination of the victim. 95 How-
ever, most often the crimes do not involve forceful physical contact.96
Attorneys will often look for signs of trauma in the child's behavior
and, absent such signs, conclude that no assault occurred.97 These
misconceptions present a need for expert witness testimony in child
sexual abuse cases.
Researchers believe that child sexual molestation cases occur, more
often than not, in a repeating pattern.98 This pattern has been recog-
nized by psychologists as the "sexually abused child syndrome." 99
However, until recently, courts have refused to recognize this syn-
drome as a scientifically established basis appropriate for expert
testimony.1 00
94. Id.
95. Wells, Expert Testimony on the Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome: To Admit or
Not To Admit, 57 FLA. B.J. 672, 673 (1983).
96. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See also Wells, supra note 95, at
674.
97. Wells, supra note 95, at 673.
98. "It is suspected that an indepth study of such incidents would demonstrate
that the actions of the aggressor constitute a pattern of conduct rather than an isolated
incident." Id. at 676.
99. Id. at 676 n.5 (citing S. Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sexual Abuse of Children:
The Law as a Therapeutic Tool for Families, in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL
FOR CHILDREN, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE MALTREATED CHILD 70 (1979)).
100. "The respective ages of the victim and the accused, as well as their relation-
ship, juxtaposed against the nature of the crime, encourage courts to conclude that
there are no reasonable opinions that can be asserted by an expert in this area."
Wells, supra note 95, at 675.
The Florida courts, exemplary of most jurisdictions, have refused to allow experts to
testify on the sexually abused child syndrome. The rationale is that "'the state of the
pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be as-
serted even by an expert.'" Id. at 675 (quoting People v. Anderson, 406 Ill. 585, 592, 94
N.E.2d 429, 432 (1950)).
Generally, the most effective type of evidence available to a prosecutor in a child
abuse case is the child's own in-court testimony. However, eliciting such can be a deli-
cate matter and may require much pre-trial preparation. For a discussion of pre-trial
preparation, questioning techniques, and child victim testimony, see generally Bern-
stein, Out Of The Mouths of Babes: When Children Take The Witness Stand, 4 CHIL-
DREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 11 (1982); Bauer, Preparation of the Sexually Abused Child for
Court Testimony, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 287 (1983); Croteau, Child Vic-
tims of Sexual Abuse, 16 PROSECUTOR 16 (1981).
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Although it is too early to tell, a new trend may be emerging re-
garding the admissibility of expert testimony in child sexual abuse
cases. Expert testimony on the child sexual abuse syndrome was ad-
mitted by a Florida judge in mid-1982.' 0 ' The expert's testimony was
the only evidence, other than the child's testimony, available to the
state's attorney, who was attempting to permanently commit a four-
teen-year-old girl to foster care.'0 2
Although not directly addressing the child sexual abuse syndrome,
an expert's testimony characterizing a small child's behavior as typi-
cal of molested children was admitted by a California court of appeal
in In re Cheryl H.103 The court affirmed a lower court decision to ad-
mit the expert's testimony. Decisions such as these may be precipi-
tant of a new breakthrough for admission of expert testimony in
child sexual abuse cases.
D. Videotaping
One of the most innovative responses to the problems associated
with child victim testimony has been the use of videotape. Although
only a few states have actually authorized substitution of the child's
in-court testimony with a videotaped version, proposals abound for
use of videotaped interviews, both in and out of court.
One proposal suggests a collective investigatory interview involving
all agencies which might later seek to question the child.104 The col-
lective interview would reduce the necessity of repeated individual
101. This expert testimony was admitted in the case of In re D.B., an unreported
Florida tenth judicial circuit court case. See Wells, supra note 95, at 675, 676 n.23.
102. Wells, supra note 95, at 676. The girl was first committed to foster care at the
age of thirteen after claiming to have been molested by her father. After she ex-
pressed her desire not to return home a year later, a permanent commitment hearing
was held. Id. at 675-76.
103. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984). In this case, a psychiatrist ob-
served an allegedly abused three-year-old playing with anatomically correct dolls and
concluded that the child's behavior was typical of molested children. The court held
that the psychiatrist's testimony "was not inadmissible hearsay because the child was
not attempting to communicate anything by her behavior." Id. at 117-18, 200 Cal. Rptr.
at 800-01. See Low, Court Allows Use of Dolls to Show Evidence of Abuse, L.A. Daily
J., Apr. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
The use of experts in such situations has received its share of criticism. Gerald
Uelmen, a professor of criminal law at Loyola University (Los Angeles), claims that
"'[i]t's causing a lot of problems .... There's a question as to whether there's a scien-
tific basis for what they say or whether just [sic] supposed to be human lie detectors.'"
L.A. Daily J., Apr. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 4. See Comment, supra note 89, at 210.
104. See generally Haas, supra note 44. In Florida, for example, when an incident
of child abuse is reported, a child protection team is appointed, consisting of pediatri-
cians, psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers, and case coordinators. Id. at 374. A sepa-
interviews, thus reducing the traumatic effect of such repetition on
the child.105 The recommended scenario for such an interview would
include a neutral setting, anatomically correct dolls, hidden cameras
and microphones, a one-way mirror, and a neutral interviewer asking
prepared questions with an opportunity for follow-up questions trans-
mitted to the interviewer by a listening device.1O6 The interview
would be observed by representatives of all agencies concerned and
would be videotaped to preserve it for later use by those agencies and
by the court, if possible.107
Without at least some means of confronting and cross-examining
the child witness in the course of the videotaped interview, however,
the defendant could effectively challenge the child's admissions on
hearsay grounds in a criminal proceeding.108 Still, early in the adver-
sarial process the non-confrontational videotaped interview could be
effectively used. By showing it to the defendant and his attorney,
plea negotiations could be motivated.109 On the other hand, the tapes
may also serve as a two-edged sword: once made, the tapes would be
subject to discovery by the defendant, who might then be able to cap-
italize on their weak points.110
rate interview by each agency involved would compound the child victim's
traumatization. Id. at 373.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 376-77.
107. Id. Potential uses for the videotape include orientating the attorneys, guardi-
ans ad litem, and other case workers to the facts and circumstances involved. Id. at
374. This can be especially helpful where caseloads are heavy, or where a case is trans-
ferred to new lawyers who need to be briefed in a short period of time. Id. at 374-75.
Another use for the videotaped interview would be to aid prosecutors in making deci-
sions about whether to press charges. Id. at 375. Psychologists and psychiatrists could
also use the videotape to assist in therapy and diagnosis. Id.
108. Id. at 377.
109. Id. at 373.
Minneapolis police have had a program of videotaping alleged victims of child abuse
for over two years. They claim to have never lost a case and to have never had a child
called by the defense to testify. In 1983, videotapes were used in 75 cases, resulting in
approximately sixty defendants pleading guilty as soon as they viewed the tapes. Vide-
otaping-Device for Fighting Child Abuse, 70 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Videotaping].
110. Such use of the tapes could facilitate impeachment of the child witness. Haas,
supra note 44, at 374.
Videotaping has been routinely used in drunk driving cases. But because drunk peo-
ple on videotape often seem perfectly sober to juries, some California police depart-
ments have stopped the taping. Videotaping, supra note 109, at 36.
In fact, the two-edged sword may already have had an effect in the McMartin pre-
school case. At the preliminary hearing, a defense attorney requested that a videotape
of an initial interview therapy session be shown in court to prove that suggestive meth-
ods were used by therapists. The tape did show damaging, leading, and suggestive
questioning on the part of the therapist. The defense maintains that the taped inter-
view proves that the children were "brainwashed." Timmick, Court Sees Videotape of
a Therapy Session For McMartin Witness, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1985, § II, at 6, col. 4.
Care should be taken in arranging videotaped interviews of sexually abused chil-
dren. Faulty decision-making about initial interviews and videotaping could result
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The Florida Legislature has led the way in enacting legislation al-
lowing videotaped interviews of child victims to be admitted in court.
A Florida statute' allows the admission of a child's videotaped testi-
mony in a sexual assault case if the court makes certain findings.
Upon a motion for an order admitting the videotape, the court must
find that the child is under sixteen years of age and that there is sub-
stantial likelihood that the child will suffer severe emotional or
mental strain if required to testify in court.ii2 The motion may be
made at any time once reasonable notice has been given to each
party, and the videotaping may occur at any time after such motion is
granted.1i 3 Unless certain conditions are met, the trial judge must
preside at the videotaping and rule on all questions as if at trial."i4
The Florida videotape statute may still be subject to a constitu-
tional challenge on confrontation grounds. However, this hurdle
either in the impairment of a case against a guilty defendant, or in the bolstering of a
case against an innocent defendant.
111. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
(1) On motion and hearing in camera and a finding that there is a substantial
likelihood that a victim or witness who is under the age of 16 would suffer
severe emotional or mental distress if he were required to testify in open
court, the trial court may order the videotaping of the testimony of the victim
or witness in a sexual abuse case or child abuse case, whether civil or criminal
in nature, which videotaped testimony is to be utilized at trial in lieu of trial
testimony in open court.
(2) The motion may be filed by:
(a) The victim or witness, or the victim's or witness' attorney, parent, legal
guardian, or guardian ad litem;
(b) A trial judge on his own motion;
(c) Any party in a civil proceeding; or
(d) The prosecuting attorney or the defendant, or the defendant's counsel.
(3) The judge shall preside, or shall appoint a special master to preside, at the
videotaping unless the following conditions are met:
(a) The child is represented by a guardian ad litem or counsel;
(b) The representative of the victim or witness and the counsel for each
party stipulate that the requirement for the presence of the judge or special
master may be waived; and
(c) The court finds at a hearing on the motion that the presence of a judge
or special master is not necessary to protect the victim or witness.
(4) The defendant and the defendant's counsel shall be present at the vide-
otaping, unless the defendant has waived this right.
(5) The motion referred to in subsection (1) may be made at any time with
reasonable notice to each party to the cause, and videotaping of testimony may
be made at any time after the court grants the motion. The videotaped testi-
mony shall be admissable as evidence in the trial of the cause.
(6) The Supreme Court may, by rule, provide procedures to implement this
section.
Id.
112. Id. § 90.90 (1).
113. Id. § 90.90 (5).
114. Id § 90.90 (3).
could be overcome by allowing confrontation and the opportunity for
cross-examination by the defendant at the videotaped proceeding. 115
It remains to be seen whether the Florida videotape statute will
survive all challenges and serve its intended purpose in alleviating
the burden placed on child abuse victims. However, other equally in-
novative measures are presently being considered involving the use
of audiovisual aids.
E. The Libai "Child Courtroom"
The problems associated with child abuse victim testimony have
not gone unnoticed in the past. However, with the development of
new technologies, lawmakers are much better equipped to deal with
the problems today than they were a decade ago.
In 1969, David Libai proposed a solution for the problem he called
"legal process trauma."116 His solution involved the construction of a
special "child courtroom"117 consisting of an inner chamber sur-
rounded by a larger room. The inner room would be furnished so as
to be less threatening to a child and would house the child, both at-
torneys, and the judge. The accused, the jury, and the public would
sit in the outer room and observe the child's testimony through one-
way glass. The accused and his attorney would each have a
microphone and earphones in order to communicate with each other.
The jury would observe both the accused and his accuser, and the de-
fendant would observe the child testifying. 1 8 The only aspect of
traditional confrontation lacking from the scenario is that the child
would not be able to see the defendant.
The rationale behind the child courtroom is that given a less stress-
ful atmosphere, a child could express himself better.119 The design of
the courtroom with its neutral inner room and the lack of eye-to-eye
contact from child to defendant would tend to reduce stress. Such an
environment might also encourage more guilty defendants to plead
guilty as charged, instead of advancing with a defense based upon de-
115. Statutory and case law support the notion that, in criminal cases, depositions
of child abuse victims must afford the defendant face-to-face contact and the right to
cross-examine. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.180. Further consideration of the constitutional challenge to FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1985) will be given later. See inkfra notes 137-45 and accom-
panying text.
116. Libai, supra note 43, at 983. Libai actually coined the phrase "legal process
trauma" in this oft-cited article.
117. Id. at 1014-25.
118. Id. at 1017. Libai based his child courtroom proposal on similar practices in
Israel. Id. at 1017 n.136. This proposal allows for a special hearing to be held in the
child courtroom, which would be taped for use later at trial as a substitute for live tes-
timony by the child. Id. at 1028.
119. Comment, supra note 46, at 34.
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stroying the child's credibility in open court.1 20
Libai's child courtroom has received its share of criticism even
from those advocating other reform measures for child witnesses.
The child courtroom has been criticized for "[overburdening] judicial
resources, for failing to protect the child from the traumatic experi-
ence of adversarial cross-examination, and for failing to add expertise
to the analysis of the child's [testimony]."121 An even stronger chal-
lenge comes from those Who assert that, in attempting to spare the
child,122 the Libai proposal goes too far in abridging the defendant's
right to confrontation.1 23
Suggestions on how to modify the Libai courtroom in order to
bring it more in accord with the sixth amendment have centered on
bringing the child into some form of visual contact with the defend-
ant. One suggestion involves the use of a closed circuit television
monitor in the inner area, which at the start of the hearing would
project the face of the defendant to the child.124 At this point, the
child would be told that the defendant is watching and listening to
his testimony. The monitor would then be switched off and the hear-
ing would proceed.125
The Libai child courtroom was innovative in its approach, but it
was restricted by the limited technological developments of its time.
Advancements in audio and video technologies now offer more feasi-
120. Id.
121. Note, supra note 47, at 139 n.39. Interestingly, these criticisms come from an
advocate of reform whose own proposals involve the increased use of expert testimony.
See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
122. A common practice among defense attorneys is to stand next to the defendant
while questioning the child witness. This forces the child to look at the defendant
while testifying, and is designed to induce stress and inhibit testimony. Comment,
supra note 46, at 34. The Libai proposal avoids this problem altogether by providing
for no child-to-defendant confrontation.
123. Id, at 34-39. The eighth circuit ruled in United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1979), that face-to-face confrontation was essential, and that electronic inter-
vention through videotaping impaired the defendant's rights and was "constitutionally
infirm." Id. at 821. This ruling places the child courtroom in constitutional jeopardy.
See inkfra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
124. Comment, supra note 46, at 37.
125. Id. This modification might solve the confrontation problem by providing mo-
mentary, electronically transmitted face-to-face confrontation. However, it would still
be subject to attack on grounds that the confrontation is not continuous throughout
the testimony, and what little confrontation there is could be skewed by the eye of the
cameraman. Perhaps a continuous closed-circuit confrontation would suffice, but the
problem of the cameraman perspective would remain. See infra notes 126-36 and ac-
companying text.
ble means for meeting the constitutional challenge while still provid-
ing needed protections for the child.
F Closed-Circuit Televised Child Testimony
With the development of cheaper and more sophisticated closed-
circuit television systems, the Libai child courtroom proposal has be-
come obsolete. A one-way or two-way closed-circuit system provides
virtually all of the advantages of the child courtroom at considerably
less cost and inconvenience. In fact, proposals for the use of closed-
circuit television are at the forefront of the movement for reform in
child witness testimony conditions.
California is currently the focal point of the controversy over
closed-circuit child witness testimony. The McMartin preschool
case126 has triggered a rapid movement toward legislative acceptance
of child witness closed-circuit testimony in California. However,
weighty constitutional considerations and contrary precedent must
first be overcome before any such innovations can occur.
Persuasive authority dictating against the admissibility and consti-
tutionality of closed-circuit child testimony was laid down by a Cali-
fornia appellate court in Hochheiser v. Superior Court.127  In
Hochheiser, the court stated that "the camera becomes the juror's
eyes, selecting and commenting upon what is seen."128  The
Hochheiser court claimed that a camera can distort perception and
lead jurors astray; however, the court did not rule that closed-circuit
testimony would be unconstitutional. Instead, it ruled that a judge
has no legal authority to allow it.129
Scarcely a month after the Hochheiser decision, prosecutors in the
McMartin preschool case moved for admission of closed-circuit child
testimony. The Los Angeles Municipal Court judge presiding over
the preliminary hearing cited Hochheiser in ruling that closed-circuit
televised testimony would not be allowed.130 This ruling sparked fre-
netic activity by the proponents of closed-circuit testimony in Califor-
126. See supra note 49. See also Video Testimony in McMartin Case Is Barred by
Judge, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 4; Senate OKs Court Use of TV in Child
Sex-Abuse Cases, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1985, § II, at 3, col. 5; State High Court Bars Chi
dren's Testimony by TV, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1985, § II, at 1, col. 5.
127. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). In Hochheiser, the prosecutors
sought to have closed-circuit testimony of the child witness admitted at trial. See
Video Testimony In McMartin Case is Barred by Judge, supra note 126.
128. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278. See also State Hiqh Court Bars
Children's Testimony by TV, supra note 126, at 3, col. 1.
129. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786-87, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79. The court characterized
closed-circuit television as constitutionally questionable and unauthorized by law. Id.
130. Judge Aviva Bobb stated, "[i]t's my view that Hochheiser cannot allow closed
circuit television in a preliminary hearing or trial .... " Video Testimony In McMar-
tin Case Is Barred by Judge, supra note 126. Bobb ruled that the children must testify
live in open court. Id.
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nia. A bill was immediately drawn up for the State Legislature and
rushed through the State Senate, where it received approval by a
narrow margin.1 31 The bill was passed by the California Assembly
and was approved by the Governor on May 18, 1985.132 The new stat-
ute allows child molestation victims under the age of ten to testify
outside the courtroom by closed-circuit television.133 Before such tes-
timony will be allowed, the new law requires the court to determine
first, whether the child's testimony would involve "a sexual offense
committed on or with the minor." Second, four factors are deline-
ated, the satisfaction of any or all of which could make the child "un-
available as a witness unless closed-circuit television is used."134
Unfortunately, the movement toward acceptance of closed-circuit
testimony in California may have been significantly impeded by a re-
cent decision of the California Supreme Court. The supreme court
refused to grant a hearing on the prosecution's appeal in the
131. Senate Bill No. 46 was submitted as an urgency bill requiring two-thirds ap-
proval (27 votes) by the California Senate. The Senate passed the bill on February 4,
1985, by a vote of 28 to 8. Senate OKs Court Use of TV in Child Sex-Abuse Cases, supra
note 126.
132. 1985 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 46, Ch. 43 (West).
A spirited debate followed the bill through the California Legislature. California
State Senator Art Torres, an avid supporter of the bill, stated that it was as "constitu-
tionally pure as possible", and that it was a "contemporary" legal tool. Senate OKs
Court Use of TV in Child Sex-Abuse Cases, supra note 126. However, California State
Senator Barry Keene, former chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, claimed
that the bill would "hinder and distort the truth gathering process." Id.
The bill has been codified into law as California Penal Code section 1347.
133. While the bill was still in the legislature as urgency legislation, proponents, in-
cluding many McMartin preschooler's parents, were hoping it would be passed in time
to spare at least some of the 41 children from the ordeal of live, in-court testimony. Id.
The law places the matter in the court's discretion, and, although passed in time,
ironically, Judge Aviva Bobb chose not to utilize the new law until the last child was
called to testify. On October 1, 1985, an 8-year-old boy, the last of the prosecution's
child witnesses, took the stand at the McMartin preliminary hearing. L.A. Times, Oct.
2, 1985, § II, at 2, col. 3.
The child, accompanied by a parent, a bailiff, and an independent monitor, testified
from a small room behind the courtroom. He watched the attorney questioning him,
and occasionally the judge, on a 19-inch color T.V. monitor. He watched the seven de-
fendants, their lawyers and the public on two 25-inch monitors. His testimony was
transmitted to the courtroom via three 19-inch monitors; two showing a close-up of the
child, and one focused on the accompanying parent. Id.
However, the delay in utilization of the bill was costly. Of the original 41 child wit-
nesses planned to testify, only 14 ended up actually taking the stand. The others
either declined or were dropped by the prosecution for various reasons, most notably
the then-present inability to testify via closed-circuit T.V. Id.
134. 1985 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 46, Ch. 43 (West) (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1347).
Hochheiser case, thereby affirming the decision.' 35 This ruling
throws the constitutionality of the new statute into question. The
ruling may also have a state-wide effect by influencing court
decisions.136
The future development of closed-circuit testimony in child abuse
cases is hard to predict. The California Legislature seems to be mov-
ing in the opposite direction of the California courts. The California
experience will undoubtedly have a profound impact throughout the
country. Therefore, keeping a close watch on developments in Cali-
fornia should prove fruitful to those researching the subject.
A common obstacle confronting all of the proposals for reform has
been the sixth amendment constitutional challenge. In order to accu-
rately determine whether such proposals will be successful, consider-
ation of how the reforms will overcome the constitutional obstacle is
in order.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO REFORMS IN CHILD
VICTIM TESTIMONY
Inherent in any proposed solution to the problems surrounding
child victim testimony is the notion that the children must be ac-
corded special protections. However, these protections come in direct
conflict with well-established principles protecting defendants' rights
in criminal proceedings.
As discussed earlier,137 the sixth amendment provides criminal de-
fendants with the right to confront their accusers. This right has
consistently been interpreted to require "face-to-face" confronta-
tion.138 That interpretation was recently followed by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Benfield.139 Unfortunately, face-to-face
confrontation is one of the trauma-causing factors the child victim
135. State High Court Bars Children's Testimony by TV, supra note 126, at 3, col. 1-
2.
136. Id at 3, col. 2. The Hochheiser decision is actually binding authority only in
the second district of California, which includes Los Angeles County. However, as the
first decision of its kind, it will probably provide a lead for other California districts.
Id. In the end, the ruling may turn out to be more significant than first imagined. As
California is the groundbreaking state with regard to closed-circuit testimony, a severe
setback in California could have rippling effects which would retard development
throughout the country.
137. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
138. For cases interpreting the right of confrontation to mean "face-to-face," see
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S.
325 (1911). Courts have rarely departed from such a strict construction of the confron-
tation clause. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant waived his right
through misconduct); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (defendant waived right when he intimidated witness before
trial).
139. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). The court in Benfield stated, "[m]ost believe that
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testimony reforms seek to minimize.140 However, despite the appar-
ent obstacle the sixth amendment presents to those reforms, there is
still hope that they can survive a constitutional attack. The Benfield
court stressed that its ruling should not discourage the development
of new technologies that closely approximate the traditional court-
room setting which the court might accept under appropriate
circumstances. 141
Jurisdictions around the country have varied determinations con-
cerning the necessity of face-to-face confrontation. In 1981, a Califor-
nia court of appeal ruled that face-to-face confrontation was
absolutely necessary.142 However, in 1975, the Missouri Supreme
Court allowed admission of closed-circuit testimony by an expert
where the defendant could watch the expert, but the expert only saw
the defendant's attorney.143
Whether the confrontation clause will result in the defeat of child
witness reform measures in the future is unknown. The trend from
coast to coast through legislation, such as that in California,144 and
through adopted laws, such as that in Florida,145 is for concern over
the psychological harm that accompanies child victim testimony.
Although it is too early to tell, given this trend and the new reforms
dealing with the problem, it is probable that some of the proposals
will pass constitutional muster.
VII. CONCLUSION
The increased use of child witnesses in sexual abuse cases necessi-
tates reforms to protect those witnesses from traumatization. Pro-
posed reforms often conflict with established principles of law. But
hopefully, through the ingenuity of drafters and the flexibility of
in some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communication are influ-
enced by face-to-face challenge." Id at 821.
140. Proposals for expansion of hearsay exceptions for the use of expert testimony,
videotapes, special courtrooms, and closed-circuit testimony in lieu of live in-court tes-
timony all involve the avoidance of a face-to-face confrontation between the child and
defendant.
Although the sixth amendment also gives the defendant the right to cross-examine
his accusers, the United States Supreme Court has stated that it does not mandate
cross-examination in every case. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-58 (1970).
141. Id.
142. Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981).
143. Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975).
144. See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
courts, the policy of protecting our children will continue to be
pursued.
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